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Abstract 
The effective and efficient management of diversified business firms that supply multiple 
products and operate in multiple, dynamic markets, especially large multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), builds upon a number of specific governance principles. These 
governance principles allow aligning environmental characteristics, strategy and 
organization.  Given the rising need to ‘learn from the world’, Doz et al. (2001) in their 
influential Harvard Business School Press book entitled ‘From Global to Metanational’, 
have proposed a new set of governance principles described under the ‘metanational’ 
umbrella concept.  This paper revisits the metanational, using a comparative institutional 
perspective; here we contrast multidivisional and metanational governance principles.  A 
comparative institutional analysis suggests that the metanational’s application potential in 
terms of actually improving the effectiveness and efficiency of MNE governance may be 
subject to more qualification than suggested by Doz et al. (2001).  Senior MNE 
management must therefore reflect carefully before substituting metanational governance 
principles for the more conventional, multidivisional ones with established contributions to 
managerial effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
Keywords: comparative institutional analysis, internalization theory, multidivisional 
governance, multinational enterprise, global strategy. 
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Introduction 
In Strategy and Structure, Alfred Chandler (1998, first edition 1962) provides a 
monumental and unparalleled description of the challenges faced by large, multi-product 
firms operating in dynamic environments when attempting to align properly environmental 
characteristics, strategy and organization.  Chandler reports that in the early 1920s, a few 
large firms pursuing strategies of product diversification, namely General Motors (GM) and 
DuPont, simultaneously - but independently of each other - crafted a new approach to their 
internal governance, i.e., the ways in which rights and responsibilities are shared among the 
various corporate participants, with the view to achieve a more effective and efficient 
alignment of their organization with environmental and strategy characteristics.  This new 
line of governance has become known as the multidivisional approach to organization. 
During the early 1920s, each company reorganized from conventional functional or unitary 
governance to multidivisional governance: GM’s transformation was brought on by the 
American auto market collapse and a related inventory crisis.  DuPont’s change was 
brought on by its dire financial state during the first two quarters of 1920, whereby, during 
these six months of severe postwar recession, only the explosives business had remained 
profitable. Though Standard Oil and Sears followed shortly thereafter, only a handful of 
companies had adopted multidivisional governance principles by the end of the 1930s 
(Chandler, 1998).  After World War II, however, most large and diversified American and 
European companies adopted these principles (Whittington & Mayer, 2000).  Even though 
imitation effects (especially within industries) may have played a role in early adoption, it 
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was largely the recognition of the improved effectiveness and efficiency properties of this 
new governance form that led to its widespread diffusion in the longer run. 
In the 1960s, Harvard’s Multinational Enterprise Project, studying the international 
expansion of US-based companies, defined a multinational enterprise (MNE), as a firm 
with an equity stake of at least 25% in production facilities in at least six countries.  A 
presence in at least six countries reflected of course substantial geographic diversification 
and therefore high environmental complexity. The Harvard project signaled the rapid 
growth of MNEs in developed economies, and their expansion globally, a phenomenon best 
described by Vernon’s (1966) influential product life cycle theory with innovations 
developed in the US home-base, being systematically diffused internationally. Importantly, 
this expansion towards multiple geographic markets was accompanied by the development 
of novel organizational approaches, all of them of the multidivisional type (creation of an 
international division, product divisions, geographic divisions or a mix thereof, etc.), see 
inter alia, Fouraker and Stopford (1968), Stopford and Wells (1972) and Franko (1976). 
Franko’s insightful analysis of continental European MNEs found an evolutionary pattern 
of organizational forms different from the one prevailing in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and a comparatively higher use of personal relationships in internal 
organization as opposed to more formal coordination mechanisms, but the end result was 
also a multidivisional approach.  By the late 1980s, MNEs (defined in this paper simply as 
firms with operations in more than one country) had established a key role for themselves 
in the world economy, with most of the largest ones espousing multidivisional governance 
principles: 
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“Collectively, [MNEs] account for over 40 percent of the world’s manufacturing output and 
almost a quarter of world trade.  About 85 percent of the world’s vehicles, 70 percent of the 
computers, 35 percent of the toothpaste and 65 percent of soft drinks are produced and 
marketed by [MNEs].” (Ghoshal and Westney, 1993, p.21) 
 
In the 1980s, a series of new MNE governance models began to appear. Several 
researchers suggested a shift from either a global or multi-domestic governance approach to 
a combination of both (Ghoshal and Westney, 1993). A global approach typically revolved 
around product divisions, whereas a multidomestic approach typically entailed the presence 
of geographic divisions and/or a portfolio of relatively independent national units.  In the 
academic and practitioner literature, various new models were articulated, including the 
‘transnational’ (Bartlett, 1986), the multi-focus firm (Prahalad & Doz, 1987), the 
heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986) and the horizontal organization (White & Poynter, 1990). 
These studies, which focused more on process issues, and advocated the infusion of 
network and voluntary execution elements in MNE organization as substitutes for 
hierarchical elements, were critical of conventional multidivisional governance, especially 
when structured around product divisions, in terms of its strong emphasis on formalized, 
top-down decision making and its alleged, limited dispersion of strategic entrepreneurial 
capabilities throughout the company (the best known critical study being Bartlett and 
Ghoshal’s 1989 analysis of the ‘transnational’).  But in spite of their critical tone, almost 
universally, all these studies accepted explicitly or implicitly five general governance 
principles, which can be considered the conventional multidivisional governance principles, 
aimed at aligning environmental characteristics, strategy and organization in large, 
diversified companies supplying multiple product lines and serving multiple, dynamic 
markets.   
  6 
The first principle prescribes a particular specialization in decision-making by 
corporate headquarters (CHQ) and the divisions. CHQ make fundamental decisions on the 
firm’s boundaries, broadly determine resource allocation among divisions and set up a 
monitoring apparatus, but they self-impose restraint on their direct intervention in business 
matters in divisions (whether product divisions, geographic divisions or a combination 
thereof), irrespective of the studied firm’s nationality and administrative heritage, at least as 
compared to the level of intervention prevalent in conventional, functionally organized 
companies. In practice, CHQ intervention in divisions (or for that matter, in smaller 
subunits such as national subsidiaries or specialized affiliates), may stretch selectively 
beyond determining divisional product/market scope, resource allocation and monitoring, 
for example when required by a crisis situation or to effect strategic integration among 
divisions, when these have overlapping but conflicting interests that cannot be resolved in a 
decentralized fashion (e.g., through agreed upon transfer prices or joint decision-making by 
the divisions themselves).  Here, it should be remembered that multidivisional governance 
itself was in several instances first introduced as a response to a crisis situation. Firm-level 
crises are often associated with reduced barriers to change, i.e., lower resistance to change 
by powerful stakeholders (e.g., functional groups inside the organization), and with senior 
management’s willingness to rise to the challenge and to take the risk of implementing a 
new set of governance principles. Crisis situations facing the entire firm typically lead to 
more centralization of power. In contrast, a favorable external environment (e.g., fast 
industry growth) combined with substantial slack resources in the divisions, may foster 
participative decentralization and increased divisional decision-making autonomy. 
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The second principle prescribes selectivity in inter-divisional interactions.  CHQ 
and divisional management accept that the effective unbundling of the firm into specific 
divisions places at least some limits on how much divisions should communicate/interact 
among each other, ànd with CHQ, though rich opportunities may obviously arise and 
should be pursued selectively, for intra-firm coordination, as well as for sharing of 
organization-wide knowledge and best practices, thereby achieving common learning 
trajectories and economies of scope across divisions. 
The third principle prescribes the use of standardized, quantitative monitoring and 
incentive systems.  CHQ adopt at least some standardized, quantitative measurement tools 
(largely based on accounting data) to evaluate divisional performance in a quasi-arm’s 
length matter, sometimes complemented selectively with adjustment mechanisms to 
address differences in divisions’ environmental context and strategic trajectories, as well as 
with a substantial arsenal of formal rules and socialization mechanisms, especially in cases 
of related diversification.  
The fourth principle, which is important in rapidly changing environments, 
prescribes specific roles for CHQ and the divisions in general innovation strategy. Here, 
CHQ set at least some boundaries on what constitutes acceptable innovation content 
(thereby defining the firm’s critical capabilities and the evolution thereof), followed by 
substantial divisional autonomy to innovate within these boundaries. This principle 
represents the functional application of the first principle above (specialization of CHQ and 
the divisions) to the area of innovation. Adhering to this principle is critical in dynamic 
environments, as it guarantees that innovation content be created by those actors best 
positioned to understand changes in relevant technologies and markets, but subject to the 
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constraints of maintaining intra-divisional coherence, especially in terms of ability to link 
innovation activities with production, and with more downstream activities such as 
marketing.  Such divisional specialization in entire, innovation-driven value chains reduces 
coordination costs in terms of figuring out which innovations ultimately make commercial 
sense.  It also puts skilled experts with deep knowledge of innovation-driven value chains 
in charge of all the functional activities involved thereby increasing the probability of value 
creation. 
Finally, the fifth principle, again relevant particularly in dynamic environments, 
prescribes a particular management of the tension that may arise between incremental and 
disruptive innovation. Here, CHQ and divisional management accept that the bulk of the 
innovation efforts in the firm should reflect incremental innovation (in line with the firm’s 
dominant logic) and should be concentrated inside the divisions. Valuable ‘autonomous 
initiatives’ reflecting more disruptive innovation, outside the scope of preset innovation 
boundaries, may arise in the divisions, especially on the basis of market or technological 
opportunities identified by individuals operating on the ‘front-line’ and in the ‘periphery’, 
but in order to bring such initiatives to fruition, a ‘divisional home’, whether in an 
established unit or new unit must be found for the innovation, or a spin-off must be 
organized to bring it to the market. In select cases, autonomous projects with large resource 
requirements that do not fit into any divisional portfolio and are associated with high risk 
may be pursued by CHQ themselves. Here, CHQ embark on a process that will change 
what is viewed in the firm as acceptable innovation and prepare the stage themselves for an 
altered dominant logic of the corporation.  
  9 
We shall discuss some of the antecedents and implications of the above principles in 
the next section, but it is important to emphasize that respecting the dynamic selectivity 
embedded in them is critical to the relative effectiveness and efficiency of internal 
governance vis-à-vis the market (i.e., de-internalization). We use the term dynamic 
selectivity to make the simple point that any corporation is characterized by needs for 
specialization and subsequent integration routines, which impose restrictions on the 
content, volume and timing of interactions among corporate participants, but such 
selectivity in interactions is itself subject to adaptation in function of the level of 
environmental turbulence and the firm-level strategic trajectory.  
Obviously, there is more to governance than the principles outlined above: in 
particular, mechanisms such as the socialization of employees, the use of procedural justice 
elements, the increased adoption of modern information and communications technology 
(ICT) and other management innovations may allow increased interactions among divisions 
and between divisions and CHQ without loss of effectiveness and efficiency, but this 
precisely reflects dynamic selectivity and does not invalidate the above governance 
principles, such as the prescription of comparatively lower inter-divisional interactions than 
intra-divisional ones, and self-imposed limits to CHQ intervention in the day-to-day 
operations of divisions, see Hill (1985), Shanley (1996), Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber 
(2000), and Eisenmann and Bower (2000) for some of the more enlightening and amusing 
discussions of multidivisional governance. 
Without, in our view, ever credibly challenging the validity of the above five 
principles, the ‘new models’ on MNE governance arising in the 1980s and 1990s did lead 
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to considerable debate regarding the (changing) nature of MNEs.  Doz and Prahalad (1993) 
speculated: 
“It is therefore not even clear that the search for a stable organizational theory of the 
[MNE] is warranted.  Perhaps researchers ought to satisfy themselves with addressing an 
evolving agenda of managerial issues created by changes in conditions for the success of 
[MNEs] and by the evolving technologies for their management.” (Doz and Prahalad, 1993, 
p.50) 
One such changing condition, faced by all MNEs is the requirement for continuous 
innovation, especially in the context of ‘triad power’, with large MNEs from North-
America, the European Union and Asia attempting to penetrate each other’s home region 
markets and driving the commodification of products previously considered innovative and 
unique (Ohmae, 1985; Rugman, 2005). The resulting, systematic process of creative 
destruction, somewhat similar to the one described by Schumpeter (1934) is both a 
powerful and threatening force. In the more general strategic management context, 
Christensen (1997) found compelling evidence of the extreme hazards resulting from 
ignoring emerging innovations. Christensen discusses the managerial dilemma of adopting 
and/or fostering nascent and potentially promising innovations inside the firm, given the 
often observed disinterest on the part of existing customers, and high priority resource 
allocation processes that encourage senior managers to abandon novel business ideas 
(Christensen, 1997).   
Irrespective of the particular innovation route chosen, MNEs do need to engage in 
new initiatives in order to sustain competitive advantage against large, especially triad-
based rivals from North-America, the European Union or Asia.  Most MNEs, even if they 
occupy a dominant position in their home region, are actually much smaller players in host 
triad markets, see Rugman and Verbeke (2004, 2005a, 2007) and Rugman (2005) for an in-
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depth analysis.  This implies that their overall market position is usually contestable, even 
in the short run.  MNEs must therefore continuously obtain new resources and recombine 
them with current ones (McGrath, MacMillan & Venkataraman, 1995).  Here, the key 
managerial challenge is the choice of a governance approach to facilitate this continuous 
sequence of knowledge development/ acquisition, absorption, diffusion and exploitation in 
an effective and efficient fashion (Rugman and Verbeke, 2002).  
Given the above context, Doz et al. (2001) have proposed a new conceptual model, 
namely the metanational approach, as the optimal governance alternative for MNEs facing 
opportunities of accessing new knowledge cropping up around the world, and seeking to 
transform these opportunities into economically viable operations. The purpose of this 
paper is to assess the metanational approach to governance, using a comparative 
institutional perspective. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next 
section, we briefly examine modern, comparative institutional thinking, with a focus on 
transaction cost/ internalization (TCI) theory and we compare the key principles 
characterizing multidivisional and metanational governance. In the third section, we use 
TCI theory as the basis of a critical analysis of the proposed metanational governance 
approach. Section four concludes. 
 
Transaction Cost/ Internalization (TCI) theory: multidivisional versus metanational 
governance 
The application of comparative institutional thinking to the MNE has been 
articulated most clearly in TCI theory, see Buckley and Casson (1976), Hennart (1982) and 
Rugman (1981). TCI theory is an evolving theoretical framework used mainly to determine 
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the most effective and efficient governance form for a set of specific transactions conducted 
by the MNE, within a broader economic and institutional context. Here, appropriate 
internal governance, in the form of comparatively lower costs of negotiating, monitoring 
and enforcing terms and conditions of exchange relative to market contracting, building 
upon Coase (1937), is a significant source of value. Though grounded in transaction cost 
economics (TCE) reasoning, TCI thinking has been developed in parallel with - but largely 
independently of - more mainstream TCE thinking, as articulated by Williamson (1985, 
1996). Both strands of comparative institutional analysis largely build upon similar 
parameters to determine MNE governance choices, even though Williamson espouses a 
particularly narrow view of (proprietary) knowledge management and innovation, building 
upon the asset specificity concept, and he neglects the impact of geography on governance 
choices.   
MNEs operate in an economic environment characterized by uncertainty and 
complexity. Here, foreign locations are attractive relative to the home country for the 
deployment of specific economic activities, but these locations also lead to challenges of 
managing ‘distance’ (cultural, administrative, geographic and economic), see Ghemawat 
(2001). Given this environmental context, international business decisions are driven by 
three key factors: bounded rationality economizing, bounded reliability economizing (with 
opportunism as one possible expression of bounded reliability), and the need to create a 
favorable organizational context, i.e. an internal environment and an interface with the 
external environment, for knowledge management and innovation in its entirety, i.e., for the 
full process of knowledge development/acquisition, absorption, diffusion and exploitation.  
We briefly discuss these three concepts in Appendix 1, in the context of the MNE. 
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Multidivisional governance is generally considered the standard, i.e. the 
comparatively more effective and efficient governance approach for large, diversified 
MNEs, meaning the governance form that to the best of our knowledge, and subject to 
proper implementation, better allows economizing on bounded rationality and bounded 
reliability, and creating value from knowledge management, at least as compared to 
conventional, functional governance. As noted above, it replaced the less satisfying 
functional governance approach, characterized by centralized decision-making and 
functionally departmentalized operations such as R&D, production and marketing.  
Williamson (1971) submits the following statement from IBM’s executive office in 1956 
concerning its transformation: 
“…the new alignment of the various areas is based on products.  Each of the product 
divisions will, within the framework of policy established by the Board of Directors and 
general management, operate almost as an individual company with its own manufacturing, 
sales and service functions.  Each of these divisions is equipped with special skills and 
product knowledge to concentrate on developing the full potential of a specific market. 
Further strength is given the organization with the creation of the corporate staff, which, 
being separate from the operating organization responsible for developing, producing, 
selling and servicing goods, can closely examine the special areas of the business and assist 
the operating executives in solving problems in these areas. (I.B.M. Business Machines, 28 
Dec 1956)”(Williamson, 1971, p.382-383). 
 
Functional governance had several advantages for firms with limited product 
ranges. Senior managers could dictate the operations of functional areas, easily relocate 
skills amongst subunits, diagnose and repair problems within specific functional areas.  
Unfortunately, managers struggled to coordinate functional subunit interactions.  For 
example, functional subunit managers were prone to hiring duplicate experts to solve 
external market problems. In addition, Chandler (1998, p. 382-383) states: “…the 
administrative load on the senior executives increased to such an extent that they were 
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unable to handle their entrepreneurial responsibility efficiently.”  Problems of bounded 
rationality reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of unitary governance.  
With multidivisional governance, those bounded rationality problems facing senior 
executives were reduced, since quasi-autonomous operating divisions took the place of 
inter-reliant, functional areas. Senior executives at CHQ focused comparatively more on 
setting strategic direction in terms of broad product/market scope boundaries, allocating 
resources among divisions, and monitoring divisional performance. Multidivisional 
governance also (unintentionally) allowed economizing on bounded reliability, as it 
mitigated the earlier problems associated with subgoal pursuit by functional managers in 
unitary governance through standardized controls and incentives.  It also reduced 
unproductive and costly communication among actors responsible for very different 
products and markets (costs that obviously depended on the relatedness / interdependencies 
among divisions).  Finally, multidivisional governance greatly facilitated adjustment to 
changes in the external environment, as it became possible to shed and add divisions 
without upsetting the entire organization. 
  Williamson (1971) described the key improvements of multidivisional governance 
as follows:  
 “The responsibility for operating decisions is assigned to [essentially self contained] 
operating divisions or ‘quasi firms’. 
 The elite staff attached to the general office performs both advisory and auditing 
functions.  Both have the effect of securing greater control over operating-division 
behavior. 
 The general office is principally concerned with strategic decisions involving planning, 
appraisal and control, including the allocation of resources among the [competing] 
operating divisions. 
 The separation of the general office from the operations provides general office 
executives with the psychological commitment to be concerned with the overall 
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performance of the organization rather than become absorbed in the affairs of the 
functional parts. 
 The resulting structure displays both rationality and synergy: the whole is greater [more 
efficient] than the sum of the parts.” (Williamson, 1971, p. 353-354)  
 
 
 
In contrast, the foundation of the metanational approach is that environmental 
changes occurring outside the firm are now forcing MNEs in most industries and countries 
to revisit fundamentally the multidivisional governance principles.  Doz et al. (2001) depict 
an emergent, global knowledge economy within which firms must access increasingly 
scattered knowledge to build or sustain competitive advantage. Corporations that tap into 
“knowledge that languishes underexploited” will be “tomorrow’s winners” (Doz. et al., 
2001, p.1). Unfortunately, according to these authors, in practice most MNEs overlook or 
fail to consider abundant pockets of valuable technologies and limit their knowledge 
seeking efforts to a few Silicon Valley-type ‘hot spots’.  
Metanational governance is substantially different from that of the multidivisional 
firm.  Rather than building upon the fundamental distinction between CHQ and divisions, 
with several possible variations on the theme, metanational governance is designed around 
three distinct, but connected activity levels: sensing, mobilizing and operations. Sensing 
means proactively searching for emerging knowledge that will build or sustain the firm. 
Through sensing, the MNE identifies and accesses innovative technologies early on, in 
order to stay ahead of competitors. Sensors are typically set up by CHQ, based on novel 
insights from the CEO or other top managers (see e.g., Doz et al., p.146 and following). 
Sensors are ‘loose and flexible networks’ with flat structures, preferably manned with local 
insiders and external alliance parties with privileged access to local knowledge (e.g., about 
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lead customers), rather than expatriates. They can even take the form of a venture capital 
fund, attracting entrepreneurs in search of funding (Doz. et al., 2001, p. 157).  
To achieve mobilizing, Doz et al. (2001, p. 8) prescribe setting up magnets, which 
“translate new knowledge into innovative products or specific market opportunities.”  
Magnets can either be permanent or temporary, and can be structured virtually and/or 
physically (e.g., located at a lead customer site). CHQ senior management is charged with 
staffing magnets with entrepreneurial people who are comfortable in uncertain and 
changing environments. Given their role of moving and recombining knowledge, they are 
really idea brokers. CHQ must also provide capital to fund new venture projects and create 
an effective culture, incentives and reward structure to motivate magnet employees.   
Finally, the operations level of the metanational is reminiscent of the divisions in a 
traditional multidivisional company.  This level is supposed to bring innovative solutions to 
market more effectively and efficiently than competitors. Here, the main role of CHQ is to 
ensure that radical innovations are transferred effectively from magnets to operations 
centers. 
From a comparative institutional perspective, the question is whether metanational 
governance is better than conventional multidivisional governance - or alternatively, 
market-based governance - at economizing on bounded rationality and bounded reliability, 
and at creating an appropriate organizational context for knowledge management and 
innovation in its entirety.  The comparison with (external) market governance is important. 
It implies simply that even if metanational governance allows reaping benefits beyond the 
reach of multidivisional governance, problems of internal, managerial coordination and 
control may still dictate de-internalization, and thereby the use of the (external) price 
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mechanism, as the main governance tool. Below, we apply TCI theory as a conceptual lens 
for a comparative evaluation of multidivisional and metanational governance. 
Table 1 compares multidivisional and metanational governance, in terms of 
adherence to the five key principles outlined above, or absence thereof: specialization in 
decision-making; selectivity in interdivisional interactions; incentive systems; general 
innovation strategy; managing the tension between incremental and disruptive innovation. 
Table 1 mentions only divisions as subunits, but in MNEs the concept of subunit might 
actually refer to any affiliate operating as a quasi-autonomous profit-unit (especially 
national subsidiaries and small product-based affiliates).  
 
--------------------------------- 
Table 1 (about here) 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
Critical analysis of metanational governance 
 
Table 1 shows that metanational governance is quite distinct from multidivisional 
governance at various levels.  As we note below, CHQ executives as well as managers 
active in magnets, sensors and operating divisions face comparatively strong challenges of 
bounded rationality economizing, bounded reliability economizing and the creation of an 
appropriate organizational context for innovation in its entirety. 
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Specialization in decision-making 
In contrast to the case of multidivisional governance, with CHQ limiting their 
involvement in day-to-day divisional operations, the CHQ in the metanational are actively 
involved in setting up sensing units and “managing by walking about the world” (Doz et 
al., 2001, p. 141).  A sensing unit needs to “have a direct reporting line to the top 
management team… [and] be nurtured and directed by those who set the company’s long-
term goals” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 165). Similarly, CHQ must go through great efforts to 
select and structure magnets (Doz et al. 2001, p. 180). In the metanational, substantial 
decision-making authority is transferred from conventional divisions ànd CHQ to magnets:  
“Magnet teams will be the powerhouses of tomorrow’s metanational organizations.  Many 
such teams will operate simultaneously, each one charged with mobilizing knowledge 
scattered around the world to create innovative products, services or processes. Together, 
this clutch of magnet teams will form a new suborganization...[in the firm]” Doz et al. 
(2001, p. 187) 
 
Thus, sensor and magnet employees are likely to command sufficient valuable 
information to change significantly the strategic direction of the MNE for better or for 
worse. This does not necessarily imply the danger of purposeful deceit, but sensor and 
magnet employees can be expected to exhibit systematic allegiance to the projects for 
which they have been made responsible, rather than to the more conventional, induced 
projects arising at the operations level. In addition, given that magnet and sensor 
employees have the flexibility and autonomy to pursue activities not subject to traditional 
success/failure criteria (see below), they may be prone to describing rather positively the 
(often non-quantifiable) opportunities they have identified as well as their past 
accomplishments, in order to secure funding and to sustain the activities they command. 
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The outcome is a new bounded reliability challenge, without necessarily equivalent benefits 
to the MNE.  Here, sensor and magnet employees may exploit to their own benefit the 
bounded rationality constraints faced by CHQ (with comparatively little insight on the 
projects pursued by the sensors and magnets), and the related participative decentralization 
they enjoy themselves, as the company comes to rely more heavily on them for its future 
growth (see Freeland, 1996 for an analysis of the participative decentralization 
phenomenon).   
CHQ may need to engage in rather heavy-handed intervention so as to link the 
outputs of sensors/magnets with the operations level. According to Doz et al. (2001, p. 110) 
the initial separation between sensors/magnets and the operations level is necessary 
because “the rules of the game for an efficient operating network are fundamentally 
different from those required to access, mobilize and innovate using new knowledge that is 
dispersed around the globe.”  Operations divisions simply are not up to this challenge (Doz 
et al., 2001, p. 162).  It then becomes the task of CHQ to “create a receptive environment 
for these bottom-up entrepreneurial insights”, by engaging in activities such as “facilitating 
chance encounters” among individuals who would not normally meet each other in a 
conventional divisionalized setting, by setting “challenging but fuzzy goals”, and by 
“creating a corporate knowledge map” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 172-173).  The problem with 
such coordination mechanisms is that they do not constitute a valid substitute for the 
necessary, permanent R&D-production-marketing linkages found in a typical division 
under multidivisional governance, as a precondition for effective, internal knowledge 
management and innovation in its entirety.  Creating such linkages ex post (after the actual 
innovation activity has taken place, and without prior operations’ level buy-in) is likely to 
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require continuous, extensive CHQ intervention rather than restrained, selective 
intervention at the operations level.   
Selectivity in inter-divisional interactions   
The two additional levels of organization, sensors and magnets, report both to each 
other and to the CHQ.  Once valuable innovations have been identified and made concrete, 
sensors and magnets must also engage in extensive interaction with the operating affiliates 
charged with producing and selling their new products and services. One positive 
interpretation of this approach is that the metanational, like an octopus, can extend its reach 
in multiple directions and attach itself to multiple things. But it is unclear how effective and 
efficient such an organization could be. It involves new business units (some of which may 
not even be completely internalized) that are explicitly meant to disrupt routinized 
communication flows and value creation processes. It thrives on an unproven ability to 
absorb and exploit tacit knowledge created in a variety of peripheral places in the world.  
And, it relies on the free and willing participation of conventional operations level 
managers, a group largely focused on specific performance metrics based on proven 
products, in bringing completely new ideas to market.  For example, even in the rather 
simple case (technologically speaking) of the record company PolyGram, the transfer of 
knowledge to operations occurs because the magnets’ staff  “visit local subsidiaries, train 
local staff, participate in the preparation of local sales and marketing plans, and create 
concert tours….” (Doz et al., 2001, p.75), i.e., are heavily involved at the operations level.  
But the use of transfer prices for such knowledge sharing and exchange among units is 
flatly rejected: 
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“Generally, it will not be possible to measure the direct profitability of a site. Any profit 
measure would depend on the artifice of transfer prices between sites within the 
metanational operations network. In most cases, these transfer prices would be highly 
arbitrary, as externally verifiable market values for a site’s contribution will be impossible 
to find.” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 204) 
  
Rather, Doz et al. (2001, p. 204) propose as substitutes for transfer prices that 
exchange of knowledge should occur voluntarily and freely, and individual sites would 
thereby benefit from building a reputation for ‘reliability’ and ‘willingness to contribute as 
a partner in the operations network’. In other words, no clear criteria are established to 
guide selectivity in interunit interactions, thereby making severe bounded reliability 
problems likely. 
Incentive systems for subunits   
A subject of great interest is the design of an appropriate incentive system for 
organizational units, whether divisions or smaller subunits. With multidivisional 
governance, each division is monitored and rewarded at least partly based on quantifiable 
output measures (e.g., based on profit margins), which are applied consistently, but with the 
possibility of selective adaptation to the external environment and strategic trajectory of 
specific divisions. Doz et al. (2001, p. 193) reject this approach: the metanational “should 
link a significant proportion of total staff incentives to the overall performance of the 
company…as opposed to narrowly defined geographical or business-unit performance”.  It 
is true that the MNE under multidivisional governance is more than an internal market, 
whence the possibility of adapting incentives to the environmental context and strategic 
trajectory faced by specific units, but only to the extent that the resulting, added challenges 
of managerial control do not make de-internalization (and the use of the external price-
mechanism) a more attractive option.  
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In contrast, in the metanational, CHQ executives are likely to face great difficulties 
monitoring and equitably rewarding sensor and magnet operations. According to the 
metanational governance principles, sensor and magnet employees are expected to act as 
entrepreneurs funded with venture capital and rewarded as ‘explorers’, motivating them to 
search the world for new knowledge, whereas individuals at the operations level should get 
so-called ‘farmer’s rewards and punishments’, thus leading to two very different incentive 
systems whereby “each type of activity requires its own performance measurement and 
incentive system”  (Doz et al. 2001, p. 99). For example, the performance assessment for a 
sensing unit should be based on the “ratio of learning per investment”, and may include 
parameters such as the “number of innovations to which it contributes”, but this is rather 
vague (Doz et al., 2001, p. 166), especially in light of Doz et al.’s (2001. p. 192) strong 
view noted above that metanationals must operate under a system of “zero transfer prices 
for knowledge…so that cash or profit credits do not change hands when knowledge is 
shared.” (Doz et al., 2001, p 192). 
But corporate venturing approaches in large organizations are often hard to sustain. 
 According to Siegel et al. (1988), corporate venture capitalists must be given substantial 
autonomy and guaranteed access to capital in order to generate both strategic benefits and 
acceptable returns on investment. In addition, entrepreneurially minded employees, 
originally hired to explore and eventually exploit new technologies, may self-select out of 
the corporate environment for a variety of reasons, especially the likely bureaucratic load of 
rules and procedures, once the innovation process reaches the production stage and the 
operations level.  Internal organizational problems may rise because sensor performance is 
hard to monitor directly by observing behavior or through output measures. Incentives and 
  23 
reward structures may need to resemble a venture capital model, but this is difficult to 
implement due to their asymmetry with what prevails in the rest of the firm (Siegel et al., 
1988).  
At the magnet level, each magnet unit also consists of entrepreneurially-minded 
individuals, who are financed (sustained) by internal venture-style funds. Magnet life spans 
and jobs may be temporary and decisions to liquidate/move a magnet can be made 
unilaterally by CHQ. Internal monitoring and reward challenges may thus increase for the 
same reasons as above regarding the sensor level. Doz et al. (2001, p. 61-62) acknowledge 
themselves, in the context of the firm STMicroelectronics, with its magnet units set up as a 
separate organization: “This organization was not subject to the tyranny of P&L accounts, 
and it was effectively ring-fenced from the other measurement tools and mechanisms that 
ST used to manage the efficiency of its operations”.   
At the operations level, each division is monitored and rewarded based on 
quantifiable outputs (e.g., profit margins as with multidivisional governance). The 
complication is the operations level’s loss of autonomy: CHQ determine which ‘outputs’ 
from the sensor and magnet levels must be taken on board by specific units at the 
operations level.  This means divisional performance results directly from CHQ decisions, 
rather than from divisional choices. The absence of selectivity/restraint in CHQ 
interventions, makes subsequent objective assessment of the operations level performance 
particularly challenging.  
Bounded reliability problems may increase because of a (perceived) lack of 
procedural justice and related internal dissonance.  These challenges are compounded by 
the bounded rationality problems facing CHQ when making resource allocation decisions 
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solely based on market and product information developed by sensors and magnets, 
without being able to understand fully the complexities associated with new markets (Hitt 
et al., 1990) or even the complexities of introducing a radical innovation into a large-scale 
production process (see below). 
General innovation strategy 
As noted above, establishing - and allocating resources to - new business units that 
must not meet the performance criteria expected of pre-existing units, may lead to 
widespread animosity among present operations level managers.  Indeed, magnets 
“sidestep the usual approval process designed for investments in operations, not 
innovation… A separate pool of internal funds (such as a venture fund) needs to be set 
aside to finance them” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 191). At the most general level, CHQ must be 
cognizant of the potential for over-innovation resulting from metanational governance, in 
accordance with Tallman and Li’s (1996) view that: “…excess product diversification may 
harm performance.”  In TCI theory terms: the extreme geographical diversification of 
knowledge management may reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of internal 
organization vis-à-vis the use of the price mechanism in the external market.  Here, the 
problem is not so much the actual location of sensors and magnets in places previously 
unexplored by the MNE, but the fact that learning must occur from locations and markets 
“beyond the reach of its operating network” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 90).  The significance of 
this is the explicit divorce of innovative activity from the operating divisions.  For the 
sensing activity, the authors make the following comment: “Extending the operating 
network to perform the sensing role would be like trying to use a power generation turbine 
to do the job of a thermostat.” (Doz et al., 2001, p. 91). In case of strong resistance from the 
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operations level to this approach, CHQ may then be forced to push emerging technology 
business units entirely outside the main organization (as minority investments) or to de-
internalize them altogether in order to satisfy minimum procedural justice requirements in 
resource allocation. Irrespective of such resistance, an important driver of selectivity in 
innovation is lacking, namely extensive coordination routines from the outset supporting 
individuals engaged in R&D and individuals working in production and marketing to 
explore continuously the feasibility of implementing and commercializing novel ideas, 
instrumental to effective and efficient knowledge management and innovation in its 
entirety. 
The need for innovation, especially through R&D, as a condition for MNE growth 
is well established (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 2007), but according to Penrose, a firm’s 
growth is also dependent on its unused productive resources, especially in terms of slack 
embodied in the top management team (Penrose, 1959).  If the innovation process proposed 
by Doz et al. (2001) indeed requires enormous commitments of energy and time from CHQ 
managers to bring new solutions to the market, because of an unfavorable internal context 
for effective and efficient innovation in its entirety, then this context will itself restrict the 
MNE’s growth potential, see Verbeke and Yuan (2007) for a related, in-depth analysis. 
 
 
Management of incremental versus disruptive innovation 
The metanational model is designed to scour the planet for emerging, disruptive 
innovations.  Instead of relying on incremental product and service improvements, which 
would reduce uncertainty, metanational sensors gain knowledge about existing and coming 
needs from lead customers and niche markets that may have global appeal.  Behaving like 
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venture-capital-seeking startups, magnets then devise solutions and accompanying business 
plans to generate project funding from CHQ.  Projects emerge from all over the world, in 
markets unfamiliar to senior managers at CHQs or at the operations level, thus creating 
severe bounded rationality problems.  Magnet managers can frame opportunity assessments 
in function of their own priorities, and thus benefit from CHQ senior management’s 
comparative ignorance.  Given the priority granted to magnet projects in the metanational, 
whereby these projects are not viewed by CHQ as ‘autonomous’ in a Burgelmanian sense 
(Burgelman, 1983), with ‘autonomous’ projects typically subject to funding caps in contrast 
to ‘induced’ projects, but constitute the essence of the MNE’s innovation approach, severe 
bounded reliability problems are likely to arise.  Indeed, these projects actually are 
‘autonomous’, i.e., not consistent with the MNE’s dominant logic in a technological or 
organizational sense, but only consistent with the metanational CHQ’s cognitive 
perspective on what constitutes valuable innovation. A sole focus on such projects will, 
when imposed upon the operations level, distract the company from important customers 
and acceptable investment returns, thus fostering problems of bounded reliability. Here, 
open-ended promises of profitability and growth made by magnets are given more weight 
than the experienced voices of managers at the operations level.  
In contrast, the multidivisional MNE can also tap into multiple locations for new 
innovations through its use of existing divisions, and therefore without incurring the 
organizational problems associated with metanational governance. One possibility within 
multidivisional governance is attaching importance to Birkinshaw-type autonomous 
initiatives, with radical innovations arising at the grass roots in the conventional divisions 
and smaller subunits, and resource allocation routines being designed in such a way as to 
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avoid the corporate immune system from kicking in (Birkinshaw, 2000; Rugman and 
Verbeke 2001, 2003). Best practices to facilitate autonomous projects potentially carrying 
radical innovations, include seed money allocated for such projects, formal requests for 
proposals, allowing incubator practices, and developing internal subunit networks 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 2001). Importantly, the above best practices to foster autonomous 
projects recognize that the innovation process should be managed in its entirety from the 
outset through dedicated routines in existing subunits even if, e.g., setting up incubators 
implies sheltering radical innovation activities in their early stages from operational 
concerns. 
According to Christensen (1997) it is true, historically, that large companies have 
suffered from a detrimental inability to see past current customer demands.  He also claims 
that developing emerging platforms and technologies and catering to lead customers is 
problematic in the real world, given the short-term profit expectations of many senior 
managers and shareholders.  But the metanational may not be the solution. Bhidé (2000) 
asserts that non-incremental innovation should be left in the willing and capable hands of 
small, growing companies.  Both authors suggest that large companies should mitigate risk 
by ‘cherry picking’, i.e., the act of acquiring small firms with demonstrated, strong product-
market potential. An alternative to cherry picking consists of taking multiple minority 
investment positions in innovative companies through corporate venture capital programs 
(Campbell et al., 2003). In fact, Doz et al. (2001, p. 157) acknowledge the use of venture 
capital funds as one route to accessing new knowledge.  But what Doz et al. (2001) do not 
recognize is that, except in a crisis situation, disruptions to well-functioning, operational 
divisions should be kept to a minimum. 
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The few cases noted by Doz et al. (2001) where operating divisions wholeheartedly 
accepted the breakthrough innovations coming from sensing and magnet operations, 
include STMicroelectronics, whereby innovative system chips had already proven their 
commercial viability as a result of contracting with a few major customers, meaning there 
actually was a proven market.  Another successful example of innovation arising from 
sensors and magnets and being accepted by operating divisions, is the case of the record 
company PolyGram, whereby the former units identified innovative content, in terms of 
new (foreign) artists with a unique repertoire.  Here, acceptance by the operating divisions 
was easy to achieve, because no fundamental technical changes were needed in the 
production process (Doz et al., 2001, p. 72). However, such cases with ex ante proven 
market potential and relatively simple technological adaptation requirements imposed on 
the production apparatus are hardly representative of radical innovation.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The metanational approach to MNE governance provides a new set of principles 
substituting for the conventional multidivisional governance principles to align 
environmental characteristics, strategy and organization in firms with high product and 
geographic diversification, operating in dynamic settings.  The question is whether this new 
set of governance principles is likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
MNEs adopting them. 
Our analysis does not establish the supremacy of the metanational governance 
principles over the more conventional principles characterizing multidivisional governance.  
Of course, the possibility should not be ruled out.  Surely, with the increasingly common 
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phenomenon of offshoring (which usually entails far less complexity than dispersing 
geographically the entire R&D function), it is clear that many MNEs now do learn from the 
world, but this usually occurs within the scope of the MNE operating divisions’ mandate to 
increase value chain effectiveness and efficiency.  Doz et al. (2001, p. 95) explicitly dismiss 
this approach as largely irrelevant to metanational functioning where the focus is on new 
sources of knowledge as a precondition for radical innovation: “if global sourcing 
structures create some metanational advantage, it will be by coincidence and good fortune”.  
On the other hand, the authors do advocate the use of networks of outsiders on a grand 
scale, throughout the world to gain access to local innovations, but they do not discuss in 
depth the problems of bounded reliability to monitor these multiple strategic alliances, 
except for the honest observation that it might be dangerous to become too reliant on 
outsiders for innovation (Doz et al. 2001, p. 203).   
Doz et al.’s (2001) dismissive perspective on global sourcing may be valid for 
conventional offshoring focused solely on cost reduction, but it is inconsistent with the 
essence of the offshoring story painted by Lewin and Peeters (2006) and Lewin et al. 
(2007). These authors predict a further increase in offshoring, driven on the one hand by the 
commoditization of many operational processes, but also, increasingly, not by mere cost 
considerations but by a need for talent that remains unsatisfied at home, especially the need 
for highly skilled human resources capable of product and process innovation. Offshoring 
may thus include sophisticated knowledge management and innovation activities but the 
success of the intended ‘reverse knowledge transfer’ to the home country and the MNE 
network depends crucially upon the management of the innovation process in its entirety, 
which fits well with multidivisional governance principles. 
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Empirical evidence should, and will, be the ultimate judge of the metanational’s 
validity.  However, empirical testing hinges on identifying and tracking the success of 
companies adhering fully to metanational governance principles; no such firms exist today, 
suggesting a predictive failure for now. Perhaps Doz and his co-authors, as INSEAD 
international business educators and gurus, will succeed in influencing a sufficient number 
of MNE CEOs to engage in this type of transformation, just as Alfred Chandler 
undoubtedly stimulated multidivisional governance adoption through influencing his 
Harvard Business School colleagues and the School’s alumni.  Highly entrepreneurial 
founders of well-funded, globally aspiring startups may also follow suit.  While the payoffs 
are unclear, our paper suggests that a number of problems associated with adopting 
metanational governance principles are not.  
Paradoxically, working with sensors and magnets might work best in relatively 
simple organizations, with hands-on, authoritarian founders/top managers, low 
diversification levels and traditional functional structures. Here, CHQ executives may 
actually still command the product/market knowledge as well as the substantial slack 
capacity required to perform the wide array of CHQ activities (including direct supervision 
of sensors and magnets) necessary to make the metanational work. If successful, such 
metanational CHQ executives, just like their counterparts in the companies adhering to 
multidivisional governance principles, can then be expected to introduce mechanisms 
geared towards reducing problems of bounded rationality and bounded reliability, and to 
create an appropriate context for innovation in its entirety.  This may entail, inter alia, 
finding stable homes for sensor and magnet units, thereby de facto making them the core of 
new operating divisions, as a complement to the existing functional organization. If 
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successful, such changes would paradoxically create incentives towards moving from 
functional toward multidivisional governance, and - in the case of excessive problems of 
internal coordination and control - toward de-internalization. 
An alternative is of course simply to outsource completely the operations level, 
which is viewed by Doz et al. as a set of activities exploiting pre-existing firm-specific 
advantages and reaping the rewards of ‘farming’.  In that case, the dynamic selectivity 
pursued by CHQ managers may entail replacing the conventional divisions in a 
multidivisional approach to governance by sensors and magnets, and specializing the firm 
in the activities pursued by the latter. The MNE would ‘sell’ the fruits of its innovation 
activities to strategic partners or even to external market participants anywhere in the 
world, with the latter actors performing the actual production activities. The key question 
would be which economic activities should still be kept inside the firm, a challenge 
especially for MNEs from advanced, knowledge-based economies such as the United 
States, the European Union and Japan 
In any case, the fine-tuning of the metanational approach to governance is likely to 
be firm-, industry- and circumstance-specific. It is unlikely that the one approach suggested 
by Doz et al. (2001) will work for all companies.  As one example, Bill Gates, Microsoft’s 
Chairman and Chief Software Architect, recently stated, “We found it easier to do research 
in multiple locations than to do product development in multiple locations.” (Ricciuti, 
2004).  In other words, no firm escapes from the requirement to assess the innovation 
process in its entirety: the number and the location of the pools an MNE will fish in will 
largely depends on the specific value chain activity considered.   
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As for the world’s largest and most diversified MNEs, multidivisional governance 
principles are likely to remain compelling.  As noted by CEO Jeff Immelt on the issue of 
selective CHQ intervention:  “When You run General Electric…there are seven to 12 times 
a year when you have to say, ‘You’re doing it my way’. If you do it 18 times, the good 
people will leave. If you do it three times, the company falls apart” (Nocera, 2007, p.14). 
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APPENDIX 1: THREE FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSACTION COST/ INTERNALIZATION 
THEORY (TCI) APPLIED TO THE MNE  
Bounded rationality reflects the scarcity of the human mind: “…human behavior is 
intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1957, p. xxiv).  Given a complex and 
uncertain environment, economic actors are unable to know, process and act on all current 
and future information. Hence, they are unable to produce comprehensive contingent 
claims contracts (Arrow, 1974). Economizing on bounded rationality is widely accepted as 
critical to both value capture and value creation in the MNE, especially when exploiting the 
MNE’s firm-specific advantages, i.e., its proprietary knowledge, which typically exhibits 
public goods characteristics  (Rugman, 1981; Rugman and Verbeke, 2005b). Economizing 
on bounded rationality is also important when contemplating alternative governance 
mechanisms for knowledge management; here, the ease of linking the knowledge 
exploration process with subsequent production and marketing activities, i.e., the challenge 
of effective and efficient innovation in its entirety, is a key consideration. 
 
Bounded reliability reflects the scarcity of making good on open-ended promises: good 
faith contractual representations do not always result in the realization of the promised 
outcomes or performance milestones due to a variety of factors. Safeguards or enforcement 
mechanisms (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) to heighten detection of - and provide 
punishment for - reneging are symptomatic.  
 
Importantly, the concept of opportunism, which is a key element in Williamsonian TCE, 
and has been criticized as an inappropriate foundation of management theory (Ghoshal and 
Moran, 1996), is only one expression of bounded reliability, as assumed implicitly in much 
of modern TCI theory and visible in numerous modern cases on MNE management. 
Opportunism implies ex-ante false commitments and/or ex-post malevolent reneging on 
commitments.  In a Williamsonian world, safeguards need to be established to reduce the 
probability of opportunistic behavior, and to punish it when it occurs. This is important 
both when dealing with outside contracting parties in a situation of small numbers 
bargaining and asset specificity, so as to mitigate the risks of cheating, and to reduce 
shirking inside the MNE. However, precisely inside the MNE, with managers often 
committed to spend a substantial portion of their career within a single company (or at least 
within a single industry), with their professional mobility dependent on their reputation, and 
with their professional pride to do what is in their mind the best job possible, more common 
expressions of bounded reliability may prevail, especially benevolent preference reversal 
over time.  
 
Benevolent preference reversal may result from both recurrent, unintentional over-
commitment and recurrent  ‘local’ prioritization, with the word ‘local’ referring to the main 
activities, dispersed in geographic space, for which specific individuals and groups are 
made responsible. These problems cannot be simply reduced to opportunism issues. 
Commitments requested by CHQ and intentions expressed to CHQ to achieve a particular 
outcome/performance level, do not always result in the realization of the promised 
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outcome/ performance milestones due to a variety of factors, including the misalignment of 
incentives. Absent opportunism, the bounded reliability problem is not that reality turns out 
differently from prior expectations (which is a mere bounded rationality issue), but that 
individuals recurrently experience (benevolent) preference reversal over time, a well-
known phenomenon in psychology (Steel and König, 2006). For example, at the level of a 
division, the divisional manager may typically promise the execution of specific investment 
projects in accordance with CHQ preferences, and commit to specific performance 
requirements. However, a combination of factors such as a substantial distance in time from 
any sanction in case of non-achievement, a substantial distance in space from the 
headquarters’ monitoring apparatus, and the relative proximity and intrinsic satisfaction 
derived from focusing on autonomous, locally driven investment opportunities with 
immediate local rewards such as an improvement of relationships with local stakeholders, 
etc. drive preference reversal. This occurs especially if ultimate performance cannot be 
appraised objectively and in full (a bounded rationality problem), as is the case when 
substantial reciprocal interdependencies exist among various subunits in the organization so 
that an individual (or unit’s) performance cannot be measured accurately.  
 
Apart from describing behavioral reality more correctly and fully than the opportunism 
concept, there are two additional advantages of adopting the bounded reliability concept: 
first, opportunism is a concept reflecting abundance (in terms of propensity to cheat and 
shirk), in contrast to bounded rationality. Bounded reliability, as is the case with bounded 
rationality, reflects scarcity, in this case scarcity of making good on open-ended promises. 
Second, for decades there has been a debate between economists and institutional theory 
scholars on the drivers of change: in economics the main driver is increased efficiency; in 
institutional theory it is increased legitimacy. A number of empirical articles in business 
have attempted to ‘test’ these two alternative explanations for changes in managerial 
settings. By building upon the bounded reliability concept, the need for alternative 
explanations may in many cases be reduced. For example, historically the relatively slow 
diffusion of multidivisional governance, in spite of its proven efficiency impacts (not taking 
into account the causal ambiguity problems associated with such a managerial innovation 
and the related risk perceptions, nor the possibility of technology-driven rigidities), has 
been caused in part by the presence of powerful functional groups, in favor of the status 
quo inside large diversified firms. From an institutional theory perspective, powerful 
stakeholders considered such a change in governance as illegitimate. From a TCI 
perspective, governance change would have increased bounded reliability problems, as the 
stakeholders resisting change would have become ‘unreliable’ (reneging on their 
employment contract expectations by simply exiting the company or by sabotaging the new 
system’s implementation, etc.) thereby reducing the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
firm’s functioning. However, when a crisis situation unfolded, and a search process was 
undertaken by the stakeholders concerned to find a solution, the new governance form’s 
legitimacy increased and the danger of reduced reliability of groups previously opposed to 
the new form faded away. In general terms: expected increases in legitimacy of a particular 
course of action, such as the choice of a governance form or pattern of behavior, can often 
reasonably be interpreted as the equivalent of reduced bounded reliability challenges 
originating from stakeholders able to affect the firm’s functioning.  
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Favorable organizational context for effective and efficient knowledge management in its 
entirety. When penetrating foreign markets, firms must first deploy existing, non-location 
bound (or internationally transferable) knowledge in those foreign locations (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981). Second, in order to be successful there, they must also 
engage in investments, permitting the combination of non-location bound knowledge from 
the home country with new, location-bound knowledge in specific host countries or 
complementary non-location bound knowledge required to operate profitably abroad. Since 
both the initial and the recombined knowledge bundles typically have public goods 
characteristics, the MNE faces a probability of serious loss, if these bundles are 
unintentionally absorbed by external actors, or improperly combined inside the MNE, in 
host markets. Third, a more recent phenomenon is the need for selectivity (and resulting 
corporate coherence) in the face of easy access to multiple technologies in multiple foreign 
locations, meant to create reverse knowledge transfers.  Here, the MNE acts as a knowledge 
network, with several home and host country operations involved as actors in knowledge 
creation and diffusion activities (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001).  
 
Cantwell’s (1995) incisive analysis of MNE technological diversification strategies has 
demonstrated that three stages of international knowledge recombination must be 
distinguished.  The first stage, covering the post World War I era up to 1970, had MNE 
foreign subsidiaries engaged primarily in the adaptation of home country knowledge to 
host country requirements. Technological diversification (albeit largely incremental) thus 
went hand in hand with geographic diversification. The second stage, which lasted until the 
mid-eighties, was an era of increased technological interrelatedness, also at the 
international level. MNE knowledge accumulation from international sources increased, 
partly driven by a reduction in transport and communication costs, and in many cases by 
the changing nature of the technological knowledge itself, which permitted its easier 
diffusion across sectors and national borders.  In the third stage, which is still ongoing now, 
new capability creation requires the use of internal networks, with a strong need for 
selectivity in the choice of interconnected locations (e.g., ‘higher order’ regions), that 
contribute to new knowledge combinations from various sources, see also Cantwell and 
Piscitello (1999) and Cantwell and Iammarino (2000). The modern MNE that strategically 
integrates complementary knowledge sources from different geographic locations 
(Cantwell, 1989) and harnesses multiple technologies (Cantwell et al., 2004) is thus one 
that requires even more than before a focus on dynamic selectivity in governance. Even in 
the context of ‘asset seeking’ international diversification (Cantwell et al., 2004), whereby 
the strong need to manage tacit knowledge and the high potential benefits of learning-by-
doing may act as stimuli for internalization, it is important to note that bounded rationality 
and bounded reliability challenges, though mitigated through internalization as compared to 
the use of market mechanisms (such as technology licensing), are not eliminated 
completely (Coase, 1937).  Senior managers must monitor and mitigate the effects of 
bounded rationality and bounded reliability inside the firm, sometimes making extensive 
use of price-like mechanisms, Hennart (1991; Rugman and Verbeke (2003). Importantly, 
most of the innovation activity described above in large MNEs occurs within global 
product divisions or regional divisions, see, e.g., Rugman (2005) 
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Table 1: Multidivisional versus metanational governance 
Governance 
principle 
Multidivisional governance Metanational governance 
Specialization in 
decision-making 
(CHQ versus 
divisions)  
Strong: 
- CHQ set product/market scope boundaries, 
make key resource allocation decisions and 
focus on overall organizational performance. 
- CHQ limit their intervention in divisions, 
except in crisis situations and for large scale, 
resource intensive projects.   
- Divisions have substantial autonomy within 
the boundaries of the product/market scope 
determined by CHQ and the resources 
allocated to them.  
Weak: 
- Sensors and magnets benefit from 
participative decentralization, but with 
continuous CHQ involvement. 
- Sensors and magnets have a ‘direct line’ with 
corporate headquarters. 
- The output of sensors and magnets leads to 
continuous CHQ intervention at the operations 
level, so as to enforce the obligatory 
absorption of ‘valuable’ innovations.  
 
 
Selectivity in 
interdivisional 
interactions 
 
Strong: 
- Comparatively limited interdivisional com-
munication and exchange. 
- Use of an internal price mechanism where 
possible in exchange between divisions. 
 
Weak:  
- Sensors and magnets interact extensively, 
and impose their preferences on the operations 
level. 
- Price mechanism is avoided where possible, 
to stimulate ‘knowledge sharing, melding and 
leveraging’. 
 
Incentive systems 
for subunits 
 
 
Standardized: 
-  CHQ monitor and reward divisions largely 
on the basis of (quasi-) standardized, 
quantifiable outputs. 
 
Variable: 
- CHQ monitor and reward sensors and 
magnets according to venture capital approach.          
- CHQ monitor and reward the operations 
level as with multidivisional governance. 
  
General 
innovation 
strategy 
Sequential and separate roles for CHQ and 
divisions: 
-  CHQ provide guidelines on what constitutes 
acceptable areas of innovation.   
- Quasi-autonomous divisions act on 
innovation opportunities within their mandate 
and bear responsibility for the results. 
 
Simultaneity and non-separation of CHQ and 
subunit actions: 
- CHQ review and select ideas based on 
business plans presented by multiple sensors 
and magnets. 
- CHQ impose the commercialization of 
innovations coming from sensors and magnets 
on the operations level.   
Management of 
incremental versus 
disruptive 
innovation 
Focus on incremental innovation: 
- Divisions reduce uncertainty by focusing on 
incremental innovations that fit current 
customer demand. 
- R&D, marketing and sales are geared 
towards products that fit preset profit margin 
requirements. 
- Intra-divisional innovation emphasis reduces 
complexity. 
- Separate routines are set up for ‘induced’ and 
‘autonomous’ innovation projects. 
Focus on emerging, disruptive innovation: 
- Sensors and magnets embrace uncertainty by 
focusing on disruptive innovations.  
- Sensors and magnets are unconstrained in 
their quest for innovation by short-term 
profitability requirements. 
-Sensors and magnets are unconstrained by 
complexity-reduction in term of innovation 
alignment with the operations level  
- Sensor and magnet innovations are inherently 
‘autonomous’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
